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Abstract
We study goodness-of-fit of discrete distributions in the distributed setting, where sam-
ples are divided between multiple users who can only release a limited amount of informa-
tion about their samples due to various information constraints. Recently, a subset of the au-
thors showed that having access to a common random seed (i.e., shared randomness) leads
to a significant reduction in the sample complexity of this problem. In this work, we pro-
vide a complete understanding of the interplay between the amount of shared randomness
available, the stringency of information constraints, and the sample complexity of the test-
ing problem by characterizing a tight trade-off between these three parameters. We provide
a general distributed goodness-of-fit protocol that as a function of the amount of shared ran-
domness interpolates smoothly between the private- and public-coin sample complexities.
We complement our upper bound with a general framework to prove lower bounds on the
sample complexity of this testing problems under limited shared randomness. Finally, we in-
stantiate our bounds for the two archetypal information constraints of communication and
local privacy, and show that our sample complexity bounds are optimal as a function of all
the parameters of the problem, including the amount of shared randomness.
A key component of our upper bounds is a new primitive of domain compression, a tool
that allows us to map distributions to a much smaller domain size while preserving their
pairwise distances, using a limited amount of randomness.
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1 Introduction
A prototypical example of statistical inference is that of goodness-of-fit, in which one seeks to de-
termine whether a set of observations fits a purported probability distribution. Considered ex-
tensively in Statistics and, more recently, in computer science under the name of identity testing,
the goodness-of-fit question for discrete probability distributions is by now well-understood.
Most of the recent work has focused on the sample complexity of the problem (i.e., the mini-
mum number of observations required to solve the task), and sought to obtain sample-optimal,
time-efficient algorithms (see, e.g., [BFR+13, Pan08, ADK15, VV17, DGPP18]). Inmany emerging
settings, however, time or even sample considerations may not be themain bottleneck. Instead,
samples may only be partially accessible, or their availability may be subjected to strict infor-
mation constraints. These constraints may be imposed in form of the number of bits allowed to
describe each sample (communication constraints) or privacy constraints for each sample.
In this context, a recent line of work [ACT18, ACT19a] has provided sample-optimal algo-
rithms under such information constraints. An important aspect revealed by this line of work
is that shared randomness is very helpful for such problems – public-coin protocols have much
lower sample complexity than private-coin protocols. However, shared randomness used by
the distributed protocols may itself be an expensive commodity in practice. With an eye to-
wards practical algorithms for deployment of these distributed statistical inference algorithms,
we consider the question of randomness-efficient distributed inference algorithms.
Specifically, we consider public randomness as a resource. In our setting, n users get inde-
pendent samples from an unknown k-ary distribution, and each can send amessage to a central
server in a one-way, non-interactive fashion. Those messages, however, have to comply with
a prespecified local information constraint, such as communication (each message can be at
most ℓ bits long) or local privacy (loosely speaking, messages must not divulge too much about
the user’s observation.) The server uses the n messages to perform the goodness-of-fit test for
the unknown distribution.
Prior work considered two natural classes of protocols: private-coin, where users and server
are randomized independently; and public-coin, where all parties share ahead of time a com-
mon random seed that they can leverage to coordinate their messages. Alternatively, one may
view shared randomness as the communication sent over the “downlink” channel by the server
to the users. In this paper, we significantly generalize prior results, by establishing a tight tradeoff
between the number of users n and the number of shared random bits s required for performing
inference under local information constraints.
A key component of our distributed protocols is domain compression, a new primitive we in-
troduce. Roughly speaking, domain compression allows one to (randomly) map a large domain
[k] to a much smaller domain of size L ≪ k, while ensuring that pairwise distances between
probability distributions on [k] are (roughly) preserved when looking at their induced distribu-
tions on [L]. This notion can then be leveraged to obtain testing protocols from “good” domain
compression mappings which use few bits of randomness.
We proceed to describe our results in the next section, before giving an overview of our tech-
niques in the subsequent section. To put our results in context, we then provide a brief overview
of prior and related work.
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1.1 Our Results
We first provide an informal overview of the setting and our results. We consider identity testing,
a classic example of goodness-of-fit, where one is given a reference distribution q over a known
domain of size k, as well as a parameter ε ∈ (0, 1). Upon receiving n i.i.d. samples X1, . . . ,Xn
from an unknown distribution p over the same domain, one must then output accept with high
constant probability if p = q, and reject if the total variation distance between p and q is at least
ε.
We study a distributed setting where theXi’s are distributed over n users who can only trans-
mit a limited amount of information about their samples to a central server, which then seeks
to solve the testing problem from the messages received (see Section 2 for the detailed setup,
and Fig. 1 for a pictorial description). For simplicity, we focus on two main applications, com-
munication constraints and local privacy; we point out, however, that our results are more gen-
eral, and can be leveraged to obtain both upper and lower bounds for the more general class of
information constraints described in [ACT18].
The communication-constrained setting. In this setting, each user can communicate at most ℓ
bits to the server. We establish the following.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). For every k, ℓ ≥ 1, s ≥ 0, there exists a protocol for identity testing over
[k] with s bits of public randomness, ℓ bits communication per user, and
n = O

√k
ε2
√
k
2ℓ
∨ 1
√
k
2s+ℓ
∨ 1

 .
users. Moreover, this number of users is optimal, up to constant factors, for all values of k, s, ℓ.
Note that for ℓ ≥ log k, we recover the centralized (unconstrained) sample complexity of
O(
√
k/ε2); for s = 0 and s ≥ log k, the expression matches respectively the public- and private-
coin sample complexities established in previous work.
An interesting interpretation of the sample complexity result mentioned above is that “one
bit of communication is worth two bits of public randomness.” Equivalently, if one interprets
the public randomness as an s bit random seed sent over the downlink channel to the users,
who then reply with their ℓ-bit message, then improving the capacity of the downlink channel is
only half as effective as improving the user-to-server channel capacities.
The locally private setting. In this setting, there is no bound on the length of the message each
user can send to the server, but the randomized mechanismW used to decide which message y
to send upon seeing sample x has to satisfy ̺-local differential privacy (̺-LDP):
max
x 6=x′
max
y
W (y | x)
W (y | x′) ≤ e
̺ . (1)
(Equivalently, the probability to send any given message y must stay roughly within a (1 ± ̺)
multiplicative factor, regardless of which xwas observed.) We prove the following.
Theorem 1.2 (Informal). For every k ≥ 1, ̺ ∈ (0, 1], s ≥ 0, there exists a protocol for identity
testing over [k] under ̺-LDP with s of public randomness, and
n = O

 k
ε2̺2
√
k
2s
∨ 1

 .
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users. Moreover, this number of users is optimal, up to constant factors, for all values of k, s, and
̺ ∈ (0, 1].
Once again, for s = 0 and s ≥ log k, this recovers respectively the public- and private-
coin sample complexities established in [ACFT19, ACT18]. In order to establish these upper
bounds, along the way we provide a sample-optimal private-coin ̺-LDP identity testing pro-
tocol (Lemma 4.7) which only requires one bit of communication per user (improving in this
respect on the sample-optimal protocols of [ACFT19]), and may be of independent interest.
General local constraints. Both Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate the versatility of our approach.
To establish our algorithmic upper bounds, we rely on a new primitive we call domain compres-
sion (onwhichwe elaborate in the next subsection). Specifically, we show in Theorem 4.1 how to
combine as a blackbox this primitive with a private-coin protocol for identity testing under any
fixed type of local constraint to obtain a protocol for identity testingwith sof public randomness,
under the same local constraints.
Our proofs of optimality, similarly, are corollaries of a general lower bound framework (Lemma5.4
and Theorem 5.5) we develop, and which extends that of [ACT18] to handle limited public ran-
domness. We believe that both techniques — the domain compression primitive, and the gen-
eral lower bound formulation – will find other applications in distributed statistical inference
problems.
1.2 Our Techniques
Our proposed schemehas amodular form and, in effect, separates the use of shared randomness
from the problem of establishing an information-constrained inference protocol. In particular,
we use shared randomness only to enable domain compression.
Domain compression. The problem of domain compression is to convert samples from an un-
known k-ary distribution p to samples from [L], while preserving the total variation distances up
to a factor of θ. Ourmain result here is a scheme that reduces the domain-size to roughly L ≈ kθ2
while preserving the total variation distance up to a factor of θ. Furthermore, our randomized
scheme does this using the optimal 2 log(1/θ) + O(1) bits of randomness, which will be crucial
for our applications. Furthermore, as we will see later, this is the best possible “compression” –
the lowest L possible – for a given θ.
In order to come up with this optimal domain compression scheme, we establish first a one-
bit ℓ2 isometry for probability vectors. Namely, we present a random mapping which converts
the domain to {0, 1} while preserving the ℓ2 distances between pairs of probability vectors. We
apply this scheme to non-overlapping parts of our k-ary probability vector to obtain the desired
domain compression scheme. Underlying our analysis is a new anti-concentration bound for
sub-Gaussian random variables, which maybe of independent interest.
Domain compression to distributed testing. With this general domain compression algorithm
at our disposal, we use s bits of randomness to obtain a reduction of the domain size to roughly
k/2s, while shrinking the statistical distances by a factor of 1/
√
2s. Now that we have exhausted
all our shared randomness in domain compression, we apply the best available private-coin
protocol, but one working on domain of size (k/2s), with new distance parameter ε/
√
2s in place
of the original ε.
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Interestingly, when instantiating this general algorithm for specific constraints of communi-
cation, it is not always optimal to use all the randomness possible. In particular, when we have ℓ
bits of communication per sample available, we should compress the domain to 2ℓ and use the
best private-coin protocol for ℓ bits of communication per sample. We formally show that one bit
of communication is worth two bits of shared randomness. In particular, we should not “waste”
any available bit of communication from the users by using too much shared randomness.
However, this only gives us a scheme with failure probability close to 1/2 at best. To boost
the probability of error to an arbitrarily small δ, the standard approach of repeating the protocol
independently, unfortunately, is not an option, as we already have exhausted all available public
randomness to perform the domain compression. Instead, we take recourse to a deterministic
amplification technique [KPS85], which leverages the properties of expander graphs to achieve
this failure probability reduction without using any additional random bit.
Optimality. When we instantiate our general algorithm for communication and privacy con-
straints, we attain performance that is jointly optimal in the information constraint parameter
(bits for communication and the LDP parameter for privacy), the number of samples, and the
bits of shared randomness. We establish this optimality by showing chi-square fluctuation lower
bounds, a technique introduced recently in [ACT18]. This approach considers the interplay be-
tween a difficult instance of the problem and the choice of the mappings satisfying information
constraints by the users. The main observation is that for public-coin protocols, the users can
choose the best mapping for any given instance of the problem by coordinating using shared
randomness, resulting in a minmax bottleneck. On the other hand, for private-coin protocols,
for each choice of mappings, the users must handle the least favorable instance, resulting in a
maxmin bottleneck. To obtain our lower bounds, we need to bridge between these two extremes
and provide bounds which seamlessly switch frommaxmin tominmax bounds as the number of
bits of shared randomness increase. We term this significant generalization of chi-square fluc-
tuation bounds the semiminmax bound and use it obtain tight bounds for our setting.
1.3 Prior and RelatedWork
Goodness-of-fit has a long and rich history in Statistics, starting with the pioneering work of
Pearson [Pea00]. More recently, the composite goodness-of-fit question (where one needs to
distinguish between the reference distribution, and all distributions sufficiently far in total vari-
ation from it) has been investigated in the theoretical computer science community under the
name identity testing [GR00, BFR+13], with a focus on computational aspects anddiscrete distri-
butions. This line of work culminated in efficient and sample-optimal testing algorithms [Pan08,
VV17, ADK15, Gol16, DGPP18]; we refer the reader to the surveys [Rub12, Can15, BW18], as well
as the recent book [Gol17] (Chapter 11) for further details on identity testing, and the more gen-
eral field of distribution testing.
Recently, there has been a surge of interest in distributed statistical inference, focusing on
density or parameter estimation under communication constraints [HMÖW18b,HÖW18,HMÖW18a,
BHÖ19] or local privacy [DJW17, EPK14, YB18, KBR16, ASZ19, AS19]. The testing counterpart,
specifically identity testing, was studied in the locally differentially private (LDP) setting byGaboardi
andRogers [GR18] andSheffet [She18], followed by [ACFT19]; and in the communication-constrained
setting in [ACT19c, ACT19b], as well as by (with a slightly different focus) [FMO18]. The role
of public randomness in distributed testing was explicitly studied in [ACT19c, ACT19b], which
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showed a quantitative gap between the sample complexities of public- and private-coin proto-
cols; those works, however, left open the fine-grained question of limited public randomness we
study here.
Related to identity testing, a recent work of [DGKR19] considers identity testing under both
memory and communication constraints. Their setting and results, however, are incomparable
to ours, as the communication constraints they focus on are global (i.e., the goal is to minimize
the total communication between parties), with no hard constraint on any given user’s message.
Our domain compression primitive, on the other hand, fits in the area of dimensionality re-
duction, a term encompassing various notions whose common theme is the mapping of high-
dimensional objects into lower dimensions, while preserving (approximately) their relevant ge-
ometric features. In our case, the objects are elements of the (k − 1)-dimensional probability
simplex, and the geometric features are the pairwise distances (mostly in ℓ1 distance); this is,
especially in view of our use of an ℓ2 isometry to achieve this goal, reminiscent of the celebrated
Johnson-Linderstrauss (JL) lemma and itsmany applications [JLS86, IM98]. The JL lemma, how-
ever, is for general high-dimensional vectors, and does not necessarily map from nor into the
probability simplex.
Closest to our primitive is the work of Kyng, Phillips, and Venkatasubramanian [KPV10],
which considers a similar question for distributions over Rd satisfying a smoothness condi-
tion. However, their results are not applicable to our setting of finite alphabet. Furthermore,
we are interested in preserving the total variation distance, and not Hellinger distance consid-
ered in [KPV10]. Finally, our proposed algorithm is randomness efficient, which is crucial for our
application. In contrast, the algorithm in [KPV10] for domain compression requires a random
mapping similar to the JL lemma construction.
2 Notation and Preliminaries
In what follows, we denote by log and ln the binary and natural logarithms, respectively. For an
integer k ≥ 1, we write [k] for the set {1, . . . , k}, and ∆(k) for the (k − 1)-dimensional prob-
ability simplex ∆(k) := {p : [k] → [0, 1] : ∑x∈[k] p(x) = 1} (where we identify a probabil-
ity distribution with its probability mass function). For p,q ∈ ∆(k), recall that dTV(p,q) :=
supS⊆[k] (p(S)− q(S)) is the total variation distance between p and q, which is equal to half their
ℓ1 distance. For our lower bounds, we shall also rely on the chi-square distance between p and
q, defined as dχ2(p || q) :=
∑
x∈[k] (p(x)− q(x))2/q(x). We indicate by x ∼ p that x is a sample
drawn from the distribution p.
We will use standard asymptotic notations O(f), Ω(f), Θ(f), as well as the (relatively) stan-
dard O˜(f), which hides polylogarithmic factors in its argument.1 We will, in addition, rely on
the notation an . bn (resp. an & bn), to indicate there exists an absolute constant C > 0 such
that an ≤ C · bn (resp. an ≥ C · bn) for all n, and accordingly write an ≍ bn when both an . bn
and an & bn. Finally, for a matrixM ∈ Rm×n, we denote by ‖M‖F and ‖M‖∗ the Frobenius and
nuclear norms ofM , respectively, and by ρ(M) its spectral radius.
1Specifically, g = O˜(f) means that there exists some absolute constant c > 0 such that g = O(f logc f).
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2.1 Setting and problem statement
In the (k, ε, δ)-identity testing problem, given a known reference distribution q ∈ ∆(k), and
given i.i.d. samples from p, we seek to test if p equals q or if it is ε-far from q in total variation
distance. Specifically, an (n, ε, δ)-test is given by a (randomized) mapping T : [k]n → {0, 1} such
that
Pr
Xn∼pn
[ T (Xn) = 0 ] > 1− δ if p = q,
Pr
Xn∼pn
[ T (Xn) = 1 ] > 1− δ if dTV(p,q) > ε.
That is, upon observing independent samplesXn, the algorithm should “accept” with probabil-
ity at least 1 − δ if the samples come from the reference distribution q and “reject” with proba-
bility at least 1− δ if they come from a distribution significantly far from q. We will often fix the
probability of failure δ to be a small constant, say 1/12, andwrite (k, ε)-identity testing and (n, ε)-
test for (k, ε, 1/12)-identity testing and (n, ε, 1/12)-test, respectively.2 The sample complexity of
(k, ε)-identity testing is the minimum n such that we can find an (n, ε)-test, over the worst-case
reference distribution q.
X1 X2 . . . Xn−1 Xn
W1 W2 . . . Wn−1 Wn
Y1 Y2 . . . Yn−1 Yn
p
Server
output
Figure 1: The information-constrained distributed model. In the private-coin setting the chan-
nelsW1, . . . ,Wn are independent, while in the public-coin setting they are jointly randomized;
in the s-coin setting, they are randomized based on both a joint U uniform on {0, 1}s, and on n
independent r.v.’s U1, . . . , Un.
We work in the following distributed setting: n users each receive an independent sample
from an unknown distribution p ∈ ∆(k), and must send a message to a central server, in the
simultaneous-message-passing (SMP) setting. The local communication constraints are mod-
eled by a familyW of “allowed” (randomized) channels, such that each user must select a chan-
nelW ∈ W and, upon seeing their sample x, send the message y = W (x) to the central server.
2Note that the specific choice of 1/12 is merely for convenience, and any constant less than 1/2 would do.
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Here, we focus on s-coin SMP protocols, where the users have access to both private random-
ness, and a limited number of uniform public random bits. Formally, s-coin SMP protocols are
described as follows.
Definition 2.1 (s-coin SMP Protocols). Let U be an s-bit random variable distributed uniformly
over {0, 1}s, independent of (X1, . . . ,Xn); and let U1, . . . , Un denote independent random vari-
ables, which are independent jointly of (X1, . . . ,Xn) and U . In an s-coin SMP protocol, all users
are given access to U , and further user i is given access to Ui. For every i ∈ [n], user i selects
the channelWi ∈ W as a function of U and Ui. The central server is given access to the random
variable U as well and its estimator and test can depend on U ; however, it does not have access
to the realization of (U1, . . . , Un).
In particular, for s = 0we recover the private-coin setting, while for s =∞we obtain the public-
coin setting. We then say an SMP protocol Π with n users is an (k, ε)-identity testing s-coin pro-
tocol usingW with n users (resp. public-coin, resp. private-coin) if it is an s-coin SMP protocol
(resp. public-coin, resp. private-coin) using channels fromW which, as a whole, constitutes an
(n, ε)-test.
The communication-constrained and LDP channel families. Two specific families of con-
straints we will consider throughout this paper are those of communication constraints, where
each user can send at most ℓ bits to the server, and those of ̺-LDP channels, where the users’
channels must satisfy the definition of local differentially privacy given in (1). We denote those
two families, respectively, byWℓ andW̺:
Wℓ := {W : [k]→ {0, 1}ℓ}, W̺ := {W : [k]→ {0, 1}∗ :W satisfies (1)} .
A useful simplification. Throughout the paper, we will assume that the domain size k is a power
of two. This can be done without loss of generality and does not restrict the scope of our results;
we establish this reduction formally in Appendix B.
3 Domain Compression from Shared Randomness
We now introduce our main algorithmic tool – a new primitive called domain compression. We
believe that the application of domain compression will go beyond this work. At a high-level, the
domain compression problem requires us to convert statistical inference problems over large
domain size to those over a small domain size. This problem is an instance of universal com-
pression, since it is clear that we cannot assume the knowledge of the generating distribution
of the samples. We present a simple formulation which can have applications for a variety of
statistical tasks. Specifically, we require that pairwise distances be preserved between the distri-
butions induced over the smaller domain. For our work, we only formulate a specific instance of
the problem; it is easy to formulate a more general version which will have applications beyond
the identity-testing problem that we consider, e.g., to continuous distributions or other distance
measures.
For a mapping f : [k]→ [L] and p ∈ ∆(k), denote by pf the distribution of f(X) ∈ [L].
Definition 3.1 (Domain compression). For L < k, U := {0, 1}s, and a mappingΨ: U × [k]→ [L],
denote by Ψu, u ∈ U , the mapping Ψu(x) = Ψ(u, x). For θ ∈ (0, 1), the mapping Ψ constitutes
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an (L, θ, δ)-domain compressionmapping ((L, θ, δ)-DCM) for∆(k) if for all p,q ∈ ∆(k) such that
dTV(p,q) ≥ ε, the mapping satisfies
Pr
[
dTV
(
pΨU ,qΨU
)
≥ θ · ε
]
≥ 1− δ, (2)
where the randomness is overU which is distributed uniformly over U . Furthermore, we say that
this domain compression mapping uses s bits of randomness.
In effect, we are asking that a DCM preserves separation in total variation distance up to a
loss-factor of θ while compressing the domain-size to L. For brevity, we shall say that such a
DCM compresses the domain-size to L with a loss-factor of θ.
Our main result in this section, stated below, shows that we can compress the domain-size
to kθ2 with a loss-factor of θ. Furthermore, we can do so using 2 log(1/θ) bits of randomness.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose k = 2t for some t ∈ N. Then, there exist positive constants c, δ0 and c0 such
that, for every θ ∈ (√c/k,√c/2) and every L ≥ kθ2/2c, there is an an (L, θ, δ0)-DCM for ∆(k).
Furthermore, this domain compressionmapping uses at most 2 log(1/θ) + c0 bits of randomness.
Stated differently, we have a DCM that compresses the domain-size to L with a loss-factor
of
√
L/k. In fact, this is the minimum loss-factor we must incur to compress the domain-size
to L. Indeed, by choosing L = 2ℓ, we can use the output of an (L, θ, δ)-DCM to enable uni-
formity testing using ℓ bits of communication. This output will be distributed over [2ℓ] and the
induced distribution will be separated from the uniform distribution by at least θε in total varia-
tion distance. Thus, using e.g., the (non-distributed) uniformity test of [Pan08], we can complete
uniformity testing using
√
2ℓ/(θ2ε2) samples. But this must exceed the lower bound of k/(ε2
√
2ℓ)
shown in [ACT18] for public-coin protocols. Therefore, θ must be less than
√
2ℓ/k. We will for-
malize this proof of optimality later (see Section 5), when we will show that the randomness of
2 log(1/θ) bits that we use for attaining this corner-point of L versus θ tradeoff is optimal, too.
Note that we can only achieve a constant δ from our scheme, which suffices for our purpose. A
more general treatment of the domain-compression problem, with optimal tradeoff for all range
of parameters, is an intriguing research direction.
As described, the domain compression problem requires us to preserve distances in total
variation distance, which is equivalent to the ℓ1 metric. We have setup this definition keeping
in view the application of domain compression in identity-testing. In general, we can consider
some other metrics. For instance, in place of Eq. (2) we can require
Pr
[
‖pΨU − qΨU‖2 ≥ θ · ε
]
≥ 1− δ. (3)
This is a stricter requirement since ‖x‖1 ≥ ‖x‖2, andwould imply Eq. (2). In fact, using a random
partition of the domain into [L] parts, it was shown in [ACT19a, Theorem VI.2] that a loss-factor
of roughly 1/
√
k can be attained for the definition of separation in Eq. (3). This in turn implies a
scheme to compress domain-size to L with a loss-factor of 1/
√
k, even for the definition of sep-
aration in Eq. (2). Comparing this with the result of Theorem 3.2, we find that the performance
of this random partition based DCM is off by a
√
L factor from the loss-factor of
√
L/k attained
by our proposed DCM in this paper. However, there is a simple modification than can help: In-
stead of applying this scheme to the entire domain, we can divide the domain into smaller parts
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and ensure ℓ2 separation for each part. If we divide the domain [k] into equal parts and attain ℓ2
separation loss-factor of θ for each part, this implies an overall loss-factor of θ in ℓ1 as well.
To enable this approach, in the result below we establish a “one-bit isometry” for ℓ2 distances
between distributions. That is, we show that a random mapping Ψ with one-bit output exists
such that the ℓ2 distance between the distribution of output is at least a constant times the ℓ2
distance between the distribution of input. Since the output is only binary, we can express the
result in terms of difference between probabilities of sets that map to 1. Note that we need this
isometry not only for distribution vectorsp and q, but also for subvectors of distribution vectors.
Theorem 3.3 (One-bit isometry). There exist absolute constants α, δ0, c0 and subsets {Su}u∈U of
[2s]with |U| = 2s+c0 and such that for every p,q ∈ [0, 1]2s we have
Pr[ |p(SU )− q(SU )| ≥ α ‖p− q‖2 ] ≥ 1− δ0, (4)
where U is distributed uniformly over U and p(S) :=∑i∈S pi.
In otherwords, there is a randomized ℓ2 isometry for distributions over [2s] that uses s+c0 bits
of randomness. The most significant aspect of the previous result, which is the main workhorse
for this work, is that the sets {Su}u∈U , are fixed and do not depend on vectors p and q.
As outlined above, wewant to apply our one-bit isometry to parts of domain. But there is one
difficulty still left in implementing this idea to obtain our desired DCM: the guarantees are only
for each part and the randomness requirement to make it work for all the parts simultaneously
maybe higher. The following simple, but useful, observation comes to the rescue.
Lemma 3.4 (Additivity of tails). Let a1, . . . , am ≥ 0, and Y1, . . . , Ym be non-negative random vari-
ables such that for some c ∈ (0, 1), Pr[Yi ≥ ai ] ≥ c for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Then,
Pr
[
Y1 + . . .+ Ym ≥ c · a1 + . . . + am
2
]
≥ c
2− c .
We defer the proof of this lemma to the appendix and of Theorem 3.3 to the end of this sec-
tion. For now, we complete the proof of Theorem 3.2, our main theorem, using these results.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Consider distributions p and q from ∆(k). Set s =
⌈
log(c/θ2)
⌉
; then by
our assumption, s ≤ t. Further, denoting J := 2t−s, for 0 ≤ j ≤ J − 1 define the vectors pj and
qj in [0, 1]2
s
as pji := pj·2s+i and q
j
i := qj·2s+i for all i ∈ [2s]. We apply Theorem 3.3 to pj and qj
to get
Pr

 |pj(SU )− qj(SU )| ≥ α
√∑
i∈SU
(pji − qji )2

 ≥ 1− δ0, 0 ≤ j ≤ J − 1.
which together with the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality yields
Pr
[
|pj(SU )− qj(SU )| ≥ α · 1√
2s
·
2s∑
i=1
|pj·2s+i − qj·2s+i|
]
≥ 1− δ0, 0 ≤ j ≤ J − 1,
We apply the “additivity of tails” property (Lemma 3.4) to arrive at
Pr

 J−1∑
j=0
|pj(SU )− qj(SU )| ≥ 2α√
2s
· dTV(p,q)

 ≥ 1− δ0
1 + δ0
. (5)
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Consider the following function Ψ with range {0, . . . , 2J − 1}: For every u ∈ U = {0, 1}s+c0 and
i ∈ [k], let
Ψ(u, i) :=
{
2j, i− j · 2s ∈ Su,
2j + 1, i− j · 2s ∈ [2s] \ Su,
0 ≤ j ≤ J − 1.
Note that dTV
(
pΨu ,qΨu
)
equals
∑J−1
j=0 |pj(SU )−qj(SU )|. Then, Eq. (5) implies thatΨ constitutes
a (2J, 2α/
√
2s, 2δ0/(1 + δ0))-DCM. The proof is completed by setting θ :=
√
4α2/2s and noting
that 2J = kθ2/(2α2).
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Denote x := p− q and consider a subset S ⊆ [2s]. With these notations,
the event we seek to handle is (
∑
i∈S xi)
2 ≥ α2‖x‖22. We associate with S a vector u ∈ {0, 1}2
s
with
ith entry given by 1{i∈S}. Then, our of interest can be expressed as x
⊺
(
uu⊺
)
x ≥ α2‖x‖22, where ⊺
denotes the transpose. Thus, we can associate a collection of vectors S1, . . . , Sm with a collection
u1, . . . , um. Then, our claim can be cast as the existence of u1, . . . , um such that
1
m
m∑
j=1
1{
x⊺
(
uu⊺
)
x<α2‖x‖2
2
} ≤ δ0.
Consider the set J of indices j ∈ [m] given by J := {j ∈ [m] : x⊺(uju⊺j )x < α2‖x‖22}. It is easy to
see that by definition of J , we have x⊺
(
1
|J |
∑
j∈J uju
⊺
j
)
x < α2‖x‖22,which further implies
λmin
(
1
|J |
∑
j∈J
uju
⊺
j
)
< α2. (6)
The main technical component of our proof is the following result.
Theorem 3.5 (Spectrum of outer products). For n ∈ N, there exist constants c0 ∈ N, c1, c2 ∈ (0, 1)
and vectors u1, . . . , um ∈ {0, 1}n withm = 2c0n such that for every J ⊆ [m] with |J | ≥ (1 − c1)m
wemust have
λmin
(
1
|J |
∑
j∈J
uju
⊺
j
)
≥ c2.
Specifically, we show that random binary vectors V1, . . . , Vm will do the job. The proof is quite
technical and requires a careful analysis of the spectrum of the random matrix
∑m
j=1 VjV
⊺
j . In
particular, effort is required to handle entries of Vj with nonzeromean; we provide the complete
proof in Appendix A.
We use vectors of Theorem 3.5, which implies that for vectors u1, . . . , um of Theorem 3.5 in-
equality (6) can hold only for |J | < (1− c1)m. Therefore,
1
m
m∑
j=1
1{
x⊺
(
uju
⊺
j
)
x<c2‖x‖
2
2
} ≤ c1,
whereby the claim follows for sets Si, i ∈ [m], given by Si = supp(ui) with δ0 := c1 and c2 :=
α2.
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4 Applications: Distributed Testing via Domain Compression
In this section, we show how the notion of domain compression developed in Section 3 yields
distributed protocols for identity testing under local information constraints. Specifically, we
show in Section 4.1 how to combine any private-coin identity testing protocol usingW with an
s-coin domain compression scheme to obtain an s-coin identity tester usingW. Then, in Sec-
tions 4.2 and 4.3, we instantiate this general algorithm with W = Wℓ and W = W̺ to obtain
s-coin identity testing protocols under communication and local privacy constraints, respec-
tively.
4.1 The General Algorithm
We establish the following result characterizing the performance of our general algorithm.
Theorem 4.1. Let W ⊆ {W : [k] → Y} be a family of channels. Suppose there exists a (k, ε)-
identity testing private-coin protocol usingW with n(k, ε) players. Then, for every s0 < s ≤ log k−
c0, there exists a (k, ε)-identity testing s-public-coin protocol usingW with C · n(ck/2s, c′ε/2s/2)
players, where s0, c0, c, c
′ > 0 are absolute constants and C > 0 is a constant depending on the
desired probability of error.
A few remarks are in order. First, we may view (and we will illustrate this in the following
sections) this statement as saying that “an optimal private-coin testing protocol under local
constraints yields, as a blackbox, an optimal s-coin testing protocol under the same local con-
straints, using domain compression.” Second, in some cases (such as Section 4.2), it is beneficial
to use this blackbox method, with a number of public coins s strictly smaller than the number
of available public coins. Namely, we do better by ignoring some of the shared randomness
resource. This is seemingly paradoxical, but the following heuristic may help resolve this co-
nundrum: reducing the domain “toomuch”may prevent the private-coin tester from using fully
what the local constraints allow. Concretely, in the case of communication constraints where
each player can send ℓ bits, reducing the domain size below 2ℓ means that some bits of com-
munication cannot be utilized. Third, and foremost, this theorem hints at the versatility of our
notion of domain compression and the simplicity of its use: (i) use public coins to reduce the
domain while preserving the pairwise distances; (ii) run a private-coin protocol on the induced
distributions, on the smaller domain.
Overview of the proof. Before delving into the details of the proof, we provide an outline of
the argument. Suppose we have an identity testing private-coin protocol Π using W. Given s
of public randomness, we use the domain compression protocol from the previous section to
reduce the domain size from k to L ≈ k/2s, while shrinking the total variation distances by
a factor θ ≈ 1/√2s. This entirely uses the s bits of public randomness, after which it suffices
to use the private-coin Π to test identity of the induced distribution p′ ∈ ∆(L) to the induced
reference distribution q′ ∈ ∆(L) with distance parameter θ · ε ≈ ε/√2s. Note that q′ is known
by all parties, as it is solely a function of q and the public randomness; and the players, after the
domain compression, hold i.i.d. samples from p′. Since the only communication between the
parties occur when running the protocol Π (which by assumption uses channels from W), the
resulting protocol satisfies the local constraints modeled byW.
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This clean approach is indeed themain element of our algorithm. The issue, however, is that
the domain compression only guarantees distance preservation with some constant probabil-
ity δ0. Therefore, when p is ε-far from q, the approach above can only guarantee correctness of
the overall protocol with probability at most δ0. In other words, the proposed protocol has low
soundness. When p = q, however, the domain compression obviously yields p′ = q′ with prob-
ability one, so the completeness guarantee holds. A standard approach to handle this would be
to amplify the success probability by independent parallel repetitions, costing only a small con-
stant factor overhead in the number of players. However, this is not an option for our setting,
since independent repetitions would require fresh public randomness, which we do not have
anymore. Further, dividing the public randomness in different random seeds and using these
disjoint seeds to run this amplification-by-repetition idea would be suboptimal, as d repetitions
would result in weaker domain compression – we will get domain of cardinality k/2s/d instead
of the desired k/2s.
To circumvent this issue, we use a different approach, that of deterministic amplification in-
troduced in [KPS85]. The idea is indeed to run the protocol several times, say d, to amplify the
probability of success, but carefully reusing the same s bit public randomness U = r for all the
d runs. Namely, we can find suitable mappings π1, . . . , πd : {0, 1}s → {0, 1}s such that upon run-
ning a protocol separately for (correlated) random seeds π1(r), π2(r), . . . , πd(r) and aggregating
the results of the d distinct runs, we can amplify the success probability from 1/3 to ≈ 1 − 1/d.
Specifically, we rely on the deterministic amplification lemma below, which guarantees that we
can drive the error from any given constant to δ paying a factor O˜(1/δ) penalty in the runtime
(i.e., the number of parallel runs of the protocol, and therefore also number of players), but
without using a single extra bit of public randomness.
Lemma 4.2 (Deterministic Amplification for One-Sided Error). For any s ∈ N and η, γ ∈ (0, 1),
there exist d = d(η, γ) and (time-efficiently computable) functions π1, . . . , πd : {0, 1}s → {0, 1}s
such that the following holds. Suppose X0 ⊆ X and A : X × {0, 1}s → Ω and E ⊆ Ω satisfy the
following:
(i) If x ∈ X0, Prσ∼{0,1}s [A(x, σ) ∈ E ] = 1; (Perfect completeness)
(ii) If x /∈ X0, Prσ∼{0,1}s [A(x, σ) /∈ E ] ≥ 1− η. (Low soundness)
Then, we have
(i) If x ∈ X0, Prσ∼{0,1}s [ ∀i ∈ [d], A(x, πi(σ)) ∈ E ] = 1; (Perfect completeness)
(ii) If x /∈ X0, Prσ∼{0,1}s [ ∃i ∈ [d], A(x, πi(σ)) /∈ E ] ≥ 1− γ. (High soundness)
Moreover, on can take d = O˜
(
η
(1−η)2γ
)
.
For completeness, we provide a self-contained proof of this result in Appendix C. Using the
lemma above, we can provide a straightforward algorithm to increase soundness: given public
randomness r ∈ {0, 1}s, we can divide the players in d disjoint groups for some suitable (con-
stant) d. Group i then runs the natural protocol we discussed, using πi(r) ∈ {0, 1}s as its public
randomness; and the server, upon seeing the outcomes of these d not-quite-independent pro-
tocols, aggregates them to produce the final outcome.
Remark 4.3 (Universality of our algorithm). Our proposed algorithm is universal in that the play-
ers are not required to know the reference distribution q (in contrast to previous work [ACT19a,
ACFT19], which relied on a reduction to uniformity testing). The same protocol for choosing
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W s fromW works for any identity testing problem: the knowledge of q is only required for the
center to complete the test.
We are now in position to provide the detailed proof of Theorem 4.1; the pseudocode of the
resulting protocol is given in Algorithm 2.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We hereafter set the constants c0, c, δ0 to be as in the statement of The-
orem 3.2. Fix a reference distribution q ∈ ∆(k), and let PRIVATEIDENTITYTESTINGW be a (k, ε)-
identity testing private-coin protocol usingW with n(k, ε) players; with a slight abuse of nota-
tion, we will use the same name to invoke it with probability of failure δ for any chosen δ ∈ (0, 1),
using n(k, ε, δ) := n(k, ε) · 72 ln(1/δ) players.3 Further, denote by Ψ: ∆(k) × {0, 1}s → ∆(L)
the (L, θ, δ0)-domain compression mapping from Theorem 3.2, where4 θ := 1/
√
2s−c0 and L :=
kθ2/2c.
By Lemma 4.2 invoked with η := 1 − δ0, γ = 1/24, there exist d = Θ(1) and (efficiently
computable) π1, . . . , πd : {0, 1}s → {0, 1}s satisfying the conclusion of the lemma. We will apply
it to the mapping A : ∆(k)× {0, 1}s → {0, 1} defined by
A(p, r) := 1{dTV(pΨr ,qΨr )≥θ·dTV(p,q)}
where the event E considered is E := {1}, i.e., the event that the domain compression mapping
is successful. Define δ′ := min(1− (11/12)1/d , 1/24) = Θ(1).
The protocol. Partition the n players into d groups Γ1, . . . ,Γd of N := n/d players, where by our
setting of n we have N ≥ n(L, θ · ε, δ′). Given the public randomness r ∈ {0, 1}s, the N players
in group Γi compute their “new” public randomness ri := πi(r), and use it to run the domain
compression Ψ. The N players in group i therefore obtain i.i.d. samples from a distribution
p(i) ∈ ∆(L); moreover, both players and server can compute the induced reference distribution
q(i) (obtained by running the domain compressionΨ on q and randomness ri). The players from
Γi then run the protocol PRIVATEIDENTITYTESTINGW on their samples from p(i), to test identity
to q(i), with parameters L, θ · ε and failure probability δ′. This results in d bits ν1, . . . , νd ∈ {0, 1}
at the server, where νi is 0 if the protocol run by group i returned accept. The server then outputs
0 (accept) if, and only if, all νi’s are equal to 0.
Correctness. First, observe that if p = q, then with probability one we have that p(i) = q(i) for
all i ∈ [d], and therefore the probability that all d protocols return 0 (accept) is at least (1− δ′)d ≥
11/12. This establishes the completeness.
Suppose now that dTV(p,q) > ε. By definition of the domain compression protocol and our
choice of A, η, we have that Prr∼{0,1}s [A(p, r) /∈ E ] ≥ δ0 = 1 − η. Lemma 4.2 then guarantees
that, with probability at least 1− γ = 23/24, there exists i∗ ∈ [d] such that dTV(p(i∗),q(i∗)) > θ · ε.
When this happens, for this i∗ the protocol run by the players in Γi∗ will output νi∗ = 1 (reject)
with probability at least 1− δ′, and therefore by a union bound the server outputs 1 (reject) with
probability at least 1− (1/24 + δ′) ≥ 1− 1/12.
3This is possible by the standard amplification trick: running the protocol independently several times and taking
amajority vote. Crucially, this uses no shared randomness to perform as PRIVATEIDENTITYTESTINGW is private-coin.
4Recall that the conditions of Theorem 3.2 mandate 2− log c2 ≤ s− c0 ≤ log k − log c2, for some constants c0 and
c.
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Number of samples. The analysis above requires that N ≥ n(L, θ · ε, δ′) ≍ n(L, θ · ε) log(1/δ′).
Recalling that n = d · N and that d, δ′ are constant,5 we have n ≍ n(k/(2c2s−c0), ε/
√
2s−c0) as
claimed.
Algorithm 1Domain compression protocol DOMAINCOMPRESSION
Require: Parameters k > 1, s ≥ 1 with k a power of two; X1, . . . ,Xn ∈ [k] distributed among n
players, random seed u ∈ {0, 1}s available to all players.
Ensure: All players compute values L, θ, and obtain independent samplesX ′1, . . . ,X
′
n ∈ [L]
1: Set σ ← s− c0, θ ← 1/
√
2σ, and L← kθ2/2c ⊲ c0, c are as in Theorem 3.2.
2: All players compute Ψ, the (L, θ, δ0)-DCM for∆(k) guaranteed by Theorem 3.2.
3: for j ∈ [n] do ⊲ As 2s = c0 · 2σ, the players interpret u as a random seed forΨ.
4: Player j maps their sampleXj ∈ [k] toX ′j ← ΨU (Xj) in [k].
5: return L ∈ N, θ ∈ (0, 1]
Algorithm 2 The full (k, ε, δ)-identity testing protocol
Require: Parameters k > 1, s ≥ 0with k a power of two; ε, δ ∈ (0, 1)
Require: Private-coin protocol PRIVATEIDENTITYTESTINGW usingW with n(k, ε, δ) players
Ensure: This is a (k, ε, δ)-identity testing protocol as long as n ≥ Cδ · n(k, ε, δ)
1: Deterministic error reduction
2: Apply Lemma 4.2 to η := 3/4, γ = δ/2, to obtain mappings π1, . . . , πd : {0, 1}s → {0, 1}s
3: Partition the n players into d groups Γ1, . . . ,Γd ⊆ [n] ofN ← n/d players
4: Set δ′ ← min(1− (1− δ)1/d, δ/2)
5: Domain compression
⊲ The constants c0, c are as in Theorem 3.2.
6: if s > c0 then ⊲ Enough public coins are available.
7: All players agree on a uniformly random R ∈ {0, 1}s. ⊲ This uses s public coins.
8: for i ∈ [d] do ⊲ players in group i run the protocol on randomness πi(R)
9: (L, θ)← DOMAINCOMPRESSION(k, s, (Xj)j∈Γi , πi(R))
10: else ⊲ If too few public coins are available, use directly the private-coin protocol.
11: (L, θ)← (k, 1)
12: for j ∈ [n] do player j setsX ′j ← Xj . ⊲ Keep same sample
13: Private-Coin Tester
14: for i ∈ [d] do ⊲ Each group runs the private-coin identity testing protocol usingW
15: Let q(i) be the reference distribution induced by DOMAINCOMPRESSION run on πi(R).
16: νi ← PRIVATEIDENTITYTESTINGW(q(i), L, θ · ε, δ′, (X ′j)j∈Γi) ⊲ νi = 0 if the test accepts
17: return 0 (accept) if νi = 0 for all i ∈ [d], 1 (reject) otherwise
In the two next subsections, we will illustrate the versatility of Theorem 4.1 by applying it
to ℓ-bit local communication constraints and ̺-local privacy constraints, respectively, to obtain
sample-optimal protocols.
5Specifically, if one aims for non-constant error probability δ ∈ (0, 1) instead of 1/12, we have d = O˜(1/δ) and
δ′ = O˜
(
δ2
)
.
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4.2 Communication-Constrained Testing
In the communication-constrained setting each player can only send ℓ < log k bits to the server:
i.e.,W =Wℓ, whereWℓ = {W : [k]→ {0, 1}ℓ}. We establish the following theorem:
Theorem 4.4. For any integers ℓ ≥ 1, s ≥ 0, there exists an ℓ-bit communication protocol with s
bits of public randomness using
n = O

√k
ε2
√
k
2ℓ
∨ 1
√
k
2s+ℓ
∨ 1


players to perform (k, ε)-identity testing. In particular, for ℓ+s ≤ log k, this becomesO
(
k
2ℓ/2ε2
√
k
2s+ℓ
)
.
As we shall see in Section 5, this is sample-optimal.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. We note first that for ℓ ≥ log k, the setting becomes equivalent to the
centralized setting, and the claimed expression becomes O(
√
k/ε2), the (known) tight central-
ized sample complexity. Thus, it is sufficient to focus on 1 ≤ ℓ < log k, which we hereafter do.
To apply Theorem 4.1, we utilize the simulate-and-infer private-coin identity testing protocol
of [ACT19a]. Specifically, we invoke the following result from [ACT19a], which gives a sample-
optimal private-coin identity testing protocol Πℓ usingWℓ:
Theorem 4.5 ([ACT19a, Corollary IV.3]). For any integer ℓ ≥ 1, there exists a private-coin (k, ε, δ)-
identity testing protocol usingWℓ and
n = O
(
k
2ℓε2
(√
k log
1
δ
+ log
1
δ
))
players. In particular, for constant δ this becomes n(k, ε) = O
(
k3/2
2ℓε2
)
.
Armedwith this protocol Πℓ, we proceed as follows. Set s¯← min(log(k)−ℓ, s) to be the “effec-
tive” number of usable public coins (intuitively, if more than log k − ℓ public coins are available,
it is not worth using them all, as compressing the domain below 2ℓ would render some of the ℓ
available bits of communication useless).
• If s¯ ≤ c0 (where c0 is the constant from the statement of Theorem 3.2), then we simply run
the private-coin protocol Πℓ. This requires
n ≥ n(k, ε) ≍ k
3/2
2ℓε2
=
√
k
ε2
·
√
k
2ℓ
·
√
k
2ℓ
≍
√
k
ε2
·
√
k
2ℓ
·
√
k
2ℓ+s
∨ 1,
since either s ≤ c0 (in which case k2ℓ ≍ k2ℓ+s ) or log(k)− ℓ ≤ c0 (in which case k2ℓ+s ≤ k2ℓ . 1).
• Else, we apply Theorem 4.1 with s¯ bits of public randomness and private-coin identity test-
ing protocol Πℓ. This can be done as long as
n ≥ C · n(ck/2s¯, c′ε/2s¯/2) ≍ (k/2
s¯)3/2
2ℓ(ε/2s¯/2)2
=
k3/2
2ℓε22s¯/2
=
√
k
ε2
·
√
k
2ℓ
·
√
k
2ℓ+s¯
=
√
k
ε2
·
√
k
2ℓ
·
√
k
2ℓ+s
∨ 1,
where the last identity holds since s¯ = (log(k) − ℓ) ∧ s.
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This concludes the proof.
4.3 Locally Differentially Private Testing
In this section, we consider the locally private channel family, where each player can only send
a message that is ̺-LDP. That is, recalling Eq. (1), we consider the channel family
W =W̺ = {W : [k]→ Y : ∀y ∈ Y,∀x1, x2 ∈ [k],W (y | x2) ≤ e̺W (y | x1) } .
We establish the following result for performance of our proposed general algorithm for testing
under privacy constraints. It will be seen in the next section that, much like the communication-
constrained setting, for the privacy-constrained setting as well our general algorithm is optimal.
Theorem 4.6. For any integers k ≥ 1, s ≥ 0, and parameter δ ∈ (0, 1), ̺ > 0, there exists a one-bit
communication ̺-LDP protocol with s bits of public randomness using
n = O

√k
ε2
√
k
̺2
√
k
2s
∨ 1


players to perform (k, ε, δ)-identity testing. When s > log k, this becomesO
(
k
ε2̺2
)
.
In [ACFT19], it was shown that the sample complexity for identity testing with ̺-local dif-
ferential privacy constraints is Θ(k3/2/(ε2̺2)) using only private randomness and Θ(k/(ε2̺2))
with (unlimited) public randomness.6 Theorem 4.6 matches these bounds in both cases. More-
over, we note here that for private-coin schemes, we can achieve the optimal sample complex-
ity with a one-bit communication protocol. This is in contrast with the private-coin protocols
of [ACFT19] which require Ω(log k) bits of communication per player. This also shows that, un-
like the communication-constrained setting, under LDP constraints there is no tradeoff between
the number of available bits of communication and sample complexity.
Proof. Wewill rely on the following lemma,which improves on the private-coin protocol of [ACFT19]
in terms of communication complexity (while achieving the same sample complexity). The pro-
tocol is inspired by that of [AS19], which provides a one-bit LDP protocol for distribution learn-
ing.
Lemma 4.7. There exists a one-bit communication private-coin ̺-LDP protocol that uses
n = O
(
k3/2
ε2̺2
log
1
δ
)
players to perform (k, ε, δ)-identity testing. For constant δ this becomes n̺(k, ε) = O
(
k3/2
ε2̺2
)
.
We defer the proof for this intermediate result to Section 4.3.1, and continue the proof of the
theorem assuming the statement. Let us denote by Π̺ the protocol from Lemma 4.7; we then
proceed as follows:
6Although, as the authors showed, their protocol could be made to work withO(log k) bits of public randomness.
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• If s ≤ c0 (where c0 is the constant from the statement of Theorem 3.2), then we just run the
private-coin protocol Π̺.
• Else, we apply Theorem 4.1 with s¯ = min(log k, s) bits of public randomness and private-
coin identity testing protocol Π̺. This can be done as long as
n ≥ C · n̺(ck/2s¯, c′ε/2s¯/2) ≍ (k/2
s¯)3/2
̺2(ε/2s¯/2)2
=
k3/2
̺2ε22s¯/2
=
√
k
ε2
·
√
k
̺2
·
√
k
2s
∨ 1
the last equality recalling that s¯ = (log k) ∧ s.
4.3.1 Proof of Lemma 4.7
It only remains to prove Lemma 4.7, our intermediary result giving a communication-efficient
private-coin protocol for identity testing under LDP. We emphasize that the main advantage of
this protocol is that we require only one bit of communication per player as compared toΩ(log k)
for those of [ACFT19], while in terms of sample complexity both protocols are optimal.
Proof of Lemma 4.7. We use the same response scheme as in [AS19]. The scheme is the fol-
lowing. Let K := 2⌈log2(k+1)⌉, which is the smallest power of two larger than k. Let HK be the
K × K Hadamard matrix. Without loss of generality, we assume K divides n (as otherwise we
can ignore the last (n − K ⌊ nK ⌋) players). Deterministically partition divide the players into K
disjoint blocks of equal size B1, B2, . . . , BK . Each player i ∈ Bj is assigned the jth column of the
Hadamard matrix. Let Cj be the location of +1’s on the jth column; the channel used by player
i ∈ Bj is given by
Wi(1 | x) =
{
e̺
e̺+1 , if x ∈ Cj,
1
e̺+1 , otherwise.
(7)
Then, following the same computations as in [AS19], we have that for all j ∈ [K],
pCj := Pr[Yi = 1 | i ∈ Bj ] =
e̺ − 1
e̺ + 1
p(Cj) +
1
e̺ + 1
.
Taking one player from each block and viewing the resulting collection of messages as a length-
K vector, we thus get n/K samples from a product distribution on {0, 1}K with mean vector
pC := (pC1 , . . . , pCK ). From a Parseval-based argument analogous to [ACFT19], we then know
that
‖pC − qC‖22 =
K(e̺ − 1)2
4(e̺ + 1)2
‖p− q‖22 ,
where qC ∈ [0, 1]K is the mean vector obtained as above when the input distribution is q in-
stead of p. (Note that qC can be explicitly computed given knowledge of q.) Therefore, when
dTV(p,q) > ε, ‖pC − qC‖22 > α := (e
̺−1)2
(e̺+1)2 ε
2, while ‖pC − qC‖22 = 0 when p = q. Since, for
product distributions over {0, 1}K , the problem of testing whether the mean vector is either
(i) a prespecified vector µ ∈ RK or (ii) at ℓ2 distance at least α from µ has sample complexity
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O
(√
K log(1/δ)/α2
)
,7 having n/K &
√
K log(1/δ)/α2 suffices, i.e.,
n = O
(
k3/2
(e̺ + 1)2
4(e̺ − 1)2ε2 log
1
δ
)
= O
(
k3/2
ε2̺2
log
1
δ
)
,
as claimed. Finally, the fact that this protocol does, indeed, satisfy the ̺-LDP constraints is im-
mediate from Eq. (7).
5 Lower Bounds
Our lower bounds consist of the following ingredients. In Section 5.1, we introduce the notion
of semimaxmin chi-square fluctuation of a family of channels W, which will be central to our
results. In Theorem 5.5 we provide an upper bound on the semimaxmin chi-square fluctuation
as a function of ‖H(W )‖∗. We then, in the corresponding following sections, use Lemma 5.4, in
conjunction with the bounds on ‖H(W )‖∗ for communication-constrained and locally private
channels, to prove our lower bounds in those two settings and establish the lower bound part
of Theorems 1.1 and 1.2.
As we aim to prove a lower bound on the sample complexity of identity testing (for general
reference distribution q), it is enough to show a lower bound on its special case of uniformity
testing. This is a sensible choice, as the uniform distribution uk is the “hardest” instance of
identity testing (see e.g., [Pan08, Gol16]).
5.1 The General Formulation: Semimaxmin decoupled chi-square fluctuation
We build on the notions of maxmin and minmax decoupled chi-square fluctuations, introduced
in [ACT18] to prove lower bounds on the sample complexity of SMP protocols with and without
public randomness, respectively. Themaxmin fluctuation results in a bottleneck for private-coin
protocols and the minmax for public-coin protocols. To obtain our lower bounds, we generalize
these and define the notion of semimaxmin decoupled chi-square fluctuation, which interpo-
lates between the maxmin and minmax fluctuations and captures the setting of limited public
randomness.
In order to do so, we first recall the definition of perturbations around a fixed distribution
q ∈ ∆(k).
Definition 5.1 ([ACT18, Definition IV.4]). Consider 0 < ε < 1, a family of distributions P =
{pz, z ∈ Z}, and a distribution ζ on Z. The pair Pζ = (P, ζ) is an almost ε-perturbation (around
q) if
Pr[ dTV(pZ ,q) ≥ ε ] ≥ α,
for some α ≥ 1/10. We denote the set of all almost ε-perturbations by Υε. Moreover, for α = 1
we refer to P as a perturbed family.
For a channel W : [k] → Y , z ∈ Z, and a symbol y ∈ Y , we denote by qW the distribution
on Y induced by q and W (so that qW (y) = ∑x∈[k]W (y | x)q(x)), and let δWz (y) := (pWz (y) −
qW (y))/qW (y). Also, for a family of channelsW, denote byW its convex hull. We now recall the
definition of decoupled chi-square fluctuation, and provide an operational meaning for it.
7This is more or less folklore; see e.g., [CDKS17, Section 2.1], or [CKM+19, Lemma 4.2].
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Definition 5.2 ([ACT18, Definition IV.3]). Consider a perturbed family P = {pz : z ∈ Z} and a
family of channelsW. The n-fold induced decoupled chi-square fluctuation of P forW n ∈ Wn is
given by
χ(2) (W n | P) := lnEZZ′
[
exp
(
n∑
i=1
〈
δWiZ , δ
Wi
Z′
〉)]
,
where
〈
δWz , δ
W
z′
〉
= EY∼pW
[
δWz (Y )δ
W
z′ (Y )
]
.
It was shown in previous work that χ(2) (W n | P) is an upper bound on the chi-square dis-
tance over the n channel output distributions induced by the almost ε-perturbation, and q; in
particular, for any testing protocol to be successful, this quantity must be bounded away from
zero. After these definitions, we are now in position to introduce the main tool underlying our
randomness tradeoff lower bound, the new notion of semimaxmin fluctuation:
Definition 5.3 (Semimaxmin Chi-square Fluctuation). For a family of channels W and s ∈ N,
the (n, ε, s)-semimaxmin decoupled chi-square fluctuation forW is given by
χ(2)(Wn, ε, s) := sup
Ws⊆W¯n
|Ws|≤2s
inf
Pζ∈Υε
E
[
χ(2) (W n | Pζ) ∧ 1
]
,
where the supremum is over all multisets Ws of Wn of size at most 2s, the infimum is over all
almost ε-perturbations Pζ , and the expectation over the uniform choice ofW n fromWs.
One may observe that when s = 0 and s = ∞, respectively, replacing the expectation by a
supremum yields themaxmin andminmax formulations from previous work. Here, we consider
instead an inner expectation, as it makes it easier to bound the resulting quantity in practice –
while making the proof of Lemma 5.4 only slightly more technical. Note that in the definition
we take a supremum over 2s choices ofW n to capture the fact that there are s public bits which
determine the distribution over the channels. If only s bits of public randomness are available,
we will show that any test using channels fromW will err with large constant probability if the
above quantity χ(2)(Wn, ε, s) is upper bounded by a sufficiently small constant.
Lemma 5.4 (Semimaxmin decoupled chi-square fluctuation bound for testing). For 0 < ε < 1,
s ∈ N, and a k-ary reference distribution p, the sample complexity n = n(k, ε, s) of (k, ε)-identity
testing with s bits of public randomness usingW must satisfy
χ(2)(Wn, ε, s) ≥ c , (8)
for some constant c > 0 depending only on the probability of error.
Proof. The proof uses Le Cam’s two-point method. Consider an almost ε-perturbation Pζ : we
note first that, due the use of private coins, the effective channel used by each user is a convex
combination of channels fromW, namely it is a channel fromW. Thus, when Xn has distribu-
tion either pn and pnz , respectively, Y
n has distribution pW
n
and pW
n
z withW
n ∈ Wn. The public
randomness then allow the users to jointly sample from any distribution onWn which can be
sampled by s independent unbiased bits, that is from any uniform distribution on a multiset
Ws ⊆ Wn of size (at most) 2s.
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Now, for every choice of channelsW n = (W1, . . . ,Wn) ∈ Wn, by Pinsker’s inequality and the
concavity of logarithm,
dTV
(
E
[
pW
n
Z
]
,pW
n
)2 ≤ 1
2
KL
(
E
[
pW
n
Z
]
|| pWn
)
≤ 1
2
ln
(
1 + dχ2
(
E
[
pW
n
Z
]
|| pWn
))
.
Also, we have the trivial bound dTV
(
E
[
pW
n
Z
]
,pW
n
)2 ≤ 1. Fix any multisetWs ⊆ Wn. Over the
uniformly random choice ofW nU ∈ Ws (using the public randomness U ), we then have using the
concavity of square roots,
EU
[
dTV
(
E
[
p
WnU
Z
]
,pW
n
U
)]2 ≤ EU
[
1 ∧
√
1
2
ln
(
1 + dχ2
(
E
[
p
Wn
U
Z
]
|| pWnU
))]2
≤ EU
[
1 ∧ 1
2
ln
(
1 + dχ2
(
E
[
p
WnU
Z
]
|| pWnU
))]
.
We then bound the right-side further using [ACT18, Lemma III.V] with θ replaced by z,Qnϑ = p
WnU
z
and Pi = pW
n
U to get
EU
[
1 ∧ ln
(
1 + dχ2
(
E
[
p
WnU
Z
]
|| pWnU
))]
≤ EU
[
1 ∧ lnEZZ′
[
n∏
i=1
(1 +HUi (Z,Z
′))
]]
≤ EU
[
1 ∧ lnEZZ′
[
e
∑n
i=1
HUi (Z,Z
′)
]]
= EU
[
1 ∧ χ(2) (W nU | Pζ)
]
,
sinceHUi (Z,Z
′) =
〈
δ
WU,i
Z , δ
WU,i
Z′
〉
. That is, we have8
EU
[
dTV
(
E
[
p
WnU
Z
]
,pW
n
U
)]2 ≤ EU[1 ∧ χ(2) (W nU | Pζ)]. (9)
Consider an (n, ε)-test T using a public-coin protocol. Denote by U the public randomness and
by Y1, . . . , Yn the messages from each user and by Z0 the set of z such that dTV(pz,p) ≥ ε.
Since Pζ is an almost ε-perturbation, Pr[Z ∈ Z0 ] ≥ α ≥ 1/10. Also, for the test T we have
PrXn∼pn [ T (U, Y n) = 1 ] ≥ 11/12 and PrXn∼pnz [T (U, Y n) = 0 ] ≥ 11/12 for every z ∈ Z0. Thus, we
obtain
1
2
Pr
Xn∼pn
[T (U, Y n) = 1 ] + 1
2
Pr
Xn∼E[pnZ ]
[ T (U, Y n) = 0 ] ≥ 11(1 + α)
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≥ 121
240
,
where the last inequality relies on the fact that α ≥ 1/10. Equivalently,
1
2
Pr
Xn∼pn
[ T (U, Y n) 6= 1 ] + 1
2
Pr
Xn∼E[pnZ]
[ T (U, Y n) 6= 0 ] ≤ 119
240
. (10)
An important remark here is that the distribution ofW nU (that is, the choice ofWs ⊆ Wn) does
not depend on Pζ . The left-hand-side of Eq. (10) above coincides with the Bayes error for test T
for the simple binary hypothesis testing problem of E
[
p
WnU
Z
]
versus EU
[
pW
n
U
]
, which must be at
least
1
2
(
1− EU
[
dTV
(
E
[
p
WnU
Z
]
,pW
n
U
)])
.
8Dropping the constant 1/2 for simplicity of the resulting bound.
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Thus, we canfindWs such that forW nU distributed uniformly onWs andany almost ε-perturbations
Pζ
EU
[
dTV
(
E
[
p
WnU
Z
]
,pW
n
U
)]
≥ 1
120
,
which along with Eq. (9) yields
EU
[
1 ∧ χ(2) (W nU | Pζ)
]
≥ c, (11)
where c = 1/14400. The result follows upon taking minimum over all almost ε-perturbations Pζ
and the maximum over all multisetsWs ∈ Wn of size at most 2s.
In view of Lemma 5.4, it then suffices to come up with a particular reference distribution
q of our choosing, and, for any type of constraint W, to upper bound χ(2)(Wn, ε, s) as a func-
tion of k, ε, s and (some quantity of) W. To do so, recalling the definition of semimaxmin de-
coupled chi-square fluctuation (Definition 5.3), it suffices to do the following: for each fixed
Ws ⊆ Wn of size at most 2s, construct an almost ε-perturbation Pζ = (P, ζ) around our q such
that E
[
χ(2) (W n | Pζ)
]
is small enough. As previously mentioned, we will choose our reference
distribution q to be the uniform distribution uk. Our almost perturbations will consist of “small
local perturbations” around uniform, and be of the form
pZ =
1
k
(1 + Z1ε, 1− Z1ε, . . . , 1 + Zk/2ε, 1− Zk/2ε) , (12)
whereZ is drawn for a suitably chosen distribution ζ onRk/2. Note that taking ζ to be uniformon
{−1, 1}k/2, we retrieve the “Paninski construction” [Pan08], widely used to prove lower bounds
in the centralized, unconstrained setting. Unfolding the definition of decoupled chi-square per-
turbation, the form chosen in (12) for our perturbation then naturally leads to the following
channel-dependent matrix H(W ), which will guide the choice of the “worst possible mixture ζ
over Z” for a given family of channels. For each channelW ∈ W, let the (k/2)-by(k/2) positive
semidefinite matrixH(W ) be defined as
H(W )i1,i2 :=
∑
y∈Y
(W (y | 2i1 − 1)−W (y | 2i1))(W (y | 2i2 − 1)−W (y | 2i2))∑
x∈[k]W (y | x)
, i1, i2 ∈ [k/2] . (13)
Thismatrix will, loosely speaking, capture the ability of channelW to discriminate between even
and odd inputs, and thus to distinguish the reference uniform distribution from such a mixture
of perturbed distributions. Our bounds will rely on the nuclear norm ‖H(W )‖∗ of the matrix
H(W ). In effect, our results characterize the informativeness of a channelW for testing in terms
of the nuclear norm of H(W ). Channels with larger nuclear norms provide more information,
and the channel constraints impose a bound on the nuclear norms, which leads to our result:
Theorem 5.5. Given n ∈ N, ε ∈ (0, 1), s ∈ N, for a channel familyW the (n, ε, s)-semimaxmin
chi-square fluctuation is bounded as
χ(2)(Wn, ε, s) = O
(
n2ε4
k3
· 2s · max
W∈W
‖H(W )‖2∗
)
,
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whenever
n ≤ k
3/2
Cε22s/2maxW∈W ‖H(W )‖∗
, (14)
where C > 0 is a constant.
The proof of this theorem is quite technical, and is provided in Appendix D. We here give an
outline of the argument.
Proof of Theorem 5.5 (Sketch). In view of the discussion above, we would like, given any mul-
tisetWs of 2s n-fold channelsW n, to design a suitable distribution for our perturbation Z which
“fools” all (or most) of the 2s channels. Loosely speaking, we would like to construct a distri-
bution for which (informally) most of variance falls in subspaces corresponding to small eigen-
vectors for a large fraction of the matricesH(Wi). To do so, we proceed along the same lines as
the proof of [ACT18, Theorem IV.18] (hereafter denoted (⋆)), reducing the problem to finding a
distribution of the perturbation vector Z such that, for any fixed (multi)setWs ⊆ Wn of size at
most 2s, the expectation
EWn
[
lnEZZ′
[
e
β2n2ε2
k
Z⊺H¯(Wn)Z′
]]
(where β > 0 is a constant, and H¯(W n) := 1n
∑n
i=1H(Wi)), is small. Using a similar argument, it
suffices to find a matrix V such that (i) ‖V ‖2F & k, (ii) each row of V has 2-norm at most 1, and
(iii) the average (overW n ∈ Ws) Frobenius norm EWn
[
‖V ⊺H(W n)V ‖F
]
is small.
Since all the matrices H¯(W n) (and therefore all V ⊺H¯(W n)V ’s) are symmetric positive semi-
definite matrices, one can then show that
1
2s
‖V ⊺

 ∑
Wn∈Ws
H¯(W n)

V ‖2F ≥ EWn[‖V ⊺H¯(W n)V ‖F ]2 . (15)
Using a construction from (⋆) applied to H˜(Ws) :=∑Wn∈Ws H¯(W n), we obtain amatrix V satis-
fying the above conditions (i) and (ii), and such that we have the following analogue of (iii):
‖V ⊺H˜(Ws)V ‖2F .
1
k
‖H˜(Ws)‖2∗ . (16)
Combining this inequality with (15) and the triangle inequality, this leads to
EWn
[
‖V ⊺H¯(W n)V ‖F
]2
.
2s
k
max
W∈W
‖H(W )‖2∗ . (17)
From (17), we can finally derive the desired bound in amanner analogous to the end of (⋆). This
is however not entirely immediate, as (by our very construction), we can only guarantee small
Frobenius norms and spectral radius on average for the V ⊺H¯(W n)V ’s. The original argument
of (⋆), however, crucially requires during its last step a pointwise guarantee; to conclude, we thus
must resort to a careful averaging argument over these spectral radii to ensuremost of them are
under control, and handle the small remaining “bad” fraction separately. More specifically, this
last part hinges on the inner min in the definition of semimaxmin fluctuation: when bounding
the quantity EWn[χ(2) (W n | Pζ) ∧ 1] in the end, we control the pointwise contribution of the
“good” W n’s via the term χ(2) (W n | Pζ) (which we show is then ≪ 1), and the contribution of
the “bad”W n’s via the term 1 (which, while large, is weighted by the fraction of “bad” channels,
which is itself small enough).
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5.2 Communication-Constrained and LDP Testing
We now instantiate the general lower bound result established in the previous section to the two
specific settingswe consider, communication and local privacy constraints. For communication-
constrained and LDP channels the nuclear norms of theH matrices can be uniformly bounded
as follows.
Lemma 5.6 ([ACT18, Lemmas V.1 and V.5]). For ℓ ≥ 1, and ̺ ∈ (0, 1], maxW∈Wℓ ‖H(W )‖∗ ≤ 2ℓ
andmaxW∈W̺ ‖H(W )‖∗ = O(̺2).
Using these bounds, we readily obtain our sample complexity results for both communication-
constrained and LDP channels.
Theorem 5.7. For 0 < ε < 1 and ℓ, s ∈ N, the sample complexity of (k, ε)-uniformity testing with
s bits of public randomness usingWℓ is at least
Ω

√k
ε2
√
k
2ℓ
∨ 1
√
k
2s+ℓ
∨ 1

 .
Theorem 5.8. For 0 < ̺ < 1, and s ∈ N the sample complexity of (k, ε)-uniformity testing with s
bits of public randomness usingW̺ is at least
Ω

√k
ε2
√
k
̺2
√
k
2s
∨ 1

 .
Indeed, from Lemma 5.4, we get that χ(2)(Wn, ε, s)must be lower bounded by a constant for
n samples to be sufficient for testing. Plugging in the bounds from Lemma 5.6 in Theorem 5.5
yields the two above results.
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A Spectrum of outer products result
In this appendix we prove Theorem 3.5 and Lemma 3.4. Theorem 3.5 is restated below:
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Theorem A.1 (Spectrum of outer products). For n ∈ N, there exist constants c0 ∈ N, c1, c2 ∈ (0, 1)
and vectors u1, . . . , um0 ∈ {0, 1}n with m0 = 2c0n such that for every J ⊆ [m0] with |J | ≥ (1 −
c1)m0 wemust have
λmin
(
1
|J |
∑
j∈J
uju
⊺
j
)
≥ c2.
Consider random, independent binary vectors V1, . . . , Vm0 ∈ {0, 1}n, with each Vi drawn uni-
formly from the set of all binary vectors of length n. We establish Theorem A.1 using probablistic
argument. It would be enough to show that:
Pr

 ∃J ⊆ [m0], |J | ≥ (1− θ)m0 s.t. λmin

 1
|J |
∑
i∈J
ViV
⊺
i

 < c2

 < 1.
First, for any J with |J | = m ≥ (1 − θ)m0, we will derive an exponential upper bounds for
the probability,
Pr

λmin

 1
|J |
∑
i∈J
ViV
⊺
i

 < t

.
Without loss of generality, we can assume J = [m]. Since
λmin

 1
|J |
∑
i∈J
ViV
⊺
i

 = min
x
{
1
m
∑m
j=1 x
⊺VjV
⊺
j x
‖x‖22
},
we first establish an exponential upper bound for
Pr

 1
m
m∑
j=1
x⊺VjV
⊺
j x < t‖x‖22

.
We derive this bound using a general anti-concentration bound for subgaussian random vari-
ables, which may be of independent interest.
TheoremA.2 (An anti-concentration bound). Consider independent randomvariablesY1, . . . , Ym
such that eachYi is zero-mean and subgaussianwith variance parameterσ
2, i.e.,E
[
eλYi
]
≤ eλ2σ2/2
for all λ ∈ R. Suppose further that, for all i, E[Y 2i ] ≥ ησ2 for some η ∈ (0, 1). Then, there exist
positive constants c1 and c2 such that for every µ ∈ R,
Pr
[
1
m
m∑
i=1
(Yi + µ)
2 ≥ c1η2
(
min
1≤i≤m
E
[
Y 2i
]
+ µ2
) ]
≥ 1− exp(−c2mη4).
To prove this result, we take recourse to the following “clipped-tail” version of Hoeffding
bound, which allows us to obtain exponential anti-concentration bounds using anti-concentration
bounds.
Lemma A.3 (Clipped-tail Hoeffding bound). For t > 0, let X1, . . . ,Xm be nonnegative, indepen-
dent random variables satisfying
Pr[Xi ≥ t ] ≥ α, 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
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Then,
Pr
[
1
m
m∑
i=1
Xi ≥ tα
2
]
≥ 1− exp
(
−mα
2
2
)
.
Proof. SinceXis are nonnegative,
∑m
i=1Xi ≥ t
∑m
i=1 1{Xi>t}. It follows that
Pr
[
1
m
m∑
i=1
Xi ≤ tα
2
]
= Pr
[
1
m
m∑
i=1
1{Xi>t} ≤
α
2
]
,
where the right-side is bounded above further by exp(−mα2/2) using Hoeffding’s inequality and
the assumption of the lemma.
We use this bound to now complete the proof of Theorem A.2.
Proof of Theorem A.2. Let Y be zero-mean and subgaussian with variance parameter σ2. Then,
forX = Y+µ, we getE
[
X4
] ≤ 8E[Y 4]+8µ4. Also, sinceY is subgaussianwith variance parameter
σ2, it is easy to show that E
[
Y 4
] ≤ 8σ2, whereby we get E[X4] ≤ 64σ4 + 8µ4. Since by our
assumption E
[
X2
]
= E
[
Y 2
]
+µ2 ≥ ησ2+µ2, it follows that E[X2]2 ≥ η2σ4+µ4. Upon combining
this with the previous bound, we obtain E
[
X4
] ≤ 64η2E[X2]2. We now invoke the Paley–Zygmund
inequality to get
Pr
[
X2 ≥ 1
2
(E
[
Y 2
]
+ µ2)
]
≥ η
2
256
.
Finally, an application of Lemma A.3 yields
Pr
[
1
m
m∑
i=1
(Yi + µ)
2 ≥ η
2
1024
(
min
1≤i≤m
E
[
Y 2i
]
+ µ2
) ]
≥ 1− exp
(
−mη
4
2562
)
,
which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem A.1. Let 1 be the all one vector in Rn. We apply Theorem A.2 to Yi = x⊺Vi −
(1⊺x)/2, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, with µ = (1⊺x)/2. Note that the Yi’s are zero-mean, and by Hoeffding’s
lemma, they are subgaussian with variance parameter ‖x‖22/4. Furthermore, it is easy to verify
that E
[
Y 2i
]
= ‖x‖22/4. Thus, the condition of Theorem A.2 holds with η = 1, which gives
Pr
[
1
m
m∑
i=1
(x⊺Vi)
2 ≥ c1 ‖x‖
2
2 + (1
⊺x)2
4
]
≥ 1− exp (−c2m) . (18)
Denote by Am the randommatrix 1m
∑m
i=1 ViV
⊺
i .Our goal is to bound λmin(Am). It will be conve-
nient to introduce a new norm ‖·‖⋆ on Rn: for x ∈ Rn,
‖x‖⋆ :=
√
‖x‖22 + (1⊺x)2.
Clearly, ‖·‖⋆ is a norm, as ‖x‖⋆ = ‖L(x)‖2 where L(x) := (x1, . . . , xn,
∑n
i=1 xi) ∈ Rn+1 is linear.
Now, if we can find an x such that x⊺Amx < λ‖x‖22, then y = x/‖x‖⋆ has ‖y‖⋆ = 1 and satisfies
y⊺Amy < λ. Therefore,
Pr
[
min
x:‖x‖
2
=1
x⊺Amx < λ
]
≤ Pr
[
min
y:‖y‖⋆=1
y⊺Amy < λ
]
(19)
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We use Eq. (18) to obtain this bound, together with an appropriate netting argument. Specifi-
cally, let N be a δ-net of the sphere { y ∈ Rn : ‖y‖⋆ = 1 } in the norm ‖·‖⋆. We can find such a
net with |N | ≤ (1 + 2δ )n ≤ e2n/δ (see, e.g., [Pis89, Lemma 4.16]), which is the net we use. By a
union bound applied to Eq. (18), we get
Pr
[
min
x∈N
x⊺Amx < c1
‖x‖22 + (1⊺x)2
4
]
< exp
(
2n
δ
− c2m
)
. (20)
We bound y⊺Amy for a y with ‖y‖⋆ = 1 by relating it to x⊺Amx for a vector x ∈ N such that
‖x− y‖⋆. While this is he standard netting argument, there is added complication since we need
to work with the norm ‖·‖⋆.
In particular, for a y such that ‖y‖⋆ consider an x ∈ N satisfying ‖x − y‖⋆ ≤ δ. Denoting
z := y − x, we decompose z = z‖ + z⊥, where z‖ ∈ spanR(1), and z⊺⊥1 = 0. By definition,
z‖ =
(z⊺1)
n 1 and z⊥ = z − z⊥. Using the inequality (a+ b)2 ≥ a2/2− b2, for every i ∈ [m]we have
(V ⊺i y)
2 = (V ⊺i x+ V
⊺
i z)
2 ≥ 1
2
(V ⊺i x)
2 − (V ⊺i z)2 ≥
1
2
(V ⊺i x)
2 − 2(V ⊺i z‖)2 − 2(V ⊺i z⊥)2.
Summing over i and using the expression for z‖, we get
y⊺Amy ≥ 1
2
· x⊺Amx− 2(z
⊺1)2
n2
· (1⊺Am1)− 2(z⊺⊥Amz⊥). (21)
To proceed further, we derive bounds for random variables (1⊺Am1) and (z
⊺
⊥Amz⊥). For the first
term, we can show
Pr
[
(1⊺Am1) > 5n
2
]
≤ 2 exp(−m/2). (22)
We provide a proof at the end. For the second term, we observe that
z⊺⊥Amz⊥ =
1
m
m∑
i=1
(z⊺⊥Vi)
2 =
1
m
m∑
i=1
(
z⊺⊥
(
Vi − 1
2
· 1
))2
.
Denote by V i a random variable which takes values 1/2 and −1/2 with equal probabilities, and
by Am the randommatrix (1/m)
∑m
i=1 V iV
⊺
i , we get
z⊺⊥Amz⊥ ≤ λmax(Am)‖z⊥‖22.
The next result, whose proof is standard and will be given later, provides a bound for λmax(Am).
Lemma A.4. There exist constants c2, c3 such that
Pr
[
λmax(Am) > c2
]
≤ exp
(
c3n− m
2
)
.
This result, together with Eq. (21) and Eq. (22), yields
Pr
[
min
y:‖y‖⋆=1
y⊺Amy ≥ t
]
≥ Pr
[
min
x∈N
x⊺Amx ≥ 2t+ 20(z⊺1)2 + 4c2‖z⊥‖22
]
− 2 exp
(
−m
2
)
− exp
(
c3n− m
2
)
≥ 1− Pr
[
min
x∈N
x⊺Amx ≥ 2t+ c4δ2
]
− 2 exp
(
−m
2
)
− exp
(
c3n− m
2
)
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where we used ‖z‖2⋆ ≥ ‖z⊥‖22 + (z⊺1)2. We set t = δ2 and note that for any x ∈ N we must have
‖x‖⋆ ≤ 1 + δ. Therefore,
Pr
[
min
x∈N
x⊺Amx < 2t+ c4δ
2
]
= Pr
[
∃x ∈ N s.t. x⊺Amx < c5 δ
2
(1 + δ)2
‖x‖2⋆
]
.
Setting δ such that c5δ2(1 + δ)2 = c2/4, it follows from Eq. (18) that
Pr
[
min
x∈N
x⊺Amx < 2t+ c4δ
2
]
≤ |N | exp(−c2m) ≤ exp
(
2n
δ
− c2m
)
.
Upon combining the bounds above, we get
Pr
[
min
y:‖y‖⋆=1
y⊺Amy < δ
2
]
≤ exp
(
2n
δ
− c2m
)
+ 2exp
(
−m
2
)
+ exp
(
c3n− m
2
)
where δ, c2, c3 are constants. Recalling Eq. (19), we have obtained
Pr
[
λmin
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
ViV
⊺
i
)
< δ2
]
≤ exp (c6n− c7m)
Finally, by a union bound of all subsets of [m0]with size larger than (1− θ)m0, we get
Pr

 ∃J ⊆ [m0], |J | ≥ (1− θ)m0 s.t. λmin

 1
|J |
∑
i∈J
ViV
⊺
i

 < δ2

 ≤ m02m0h(θ) exp (c6n− c7m0(1− θ)) ,
where h(·) denotes the binary entropy function, and we have used the fact that the number of
subsets of [m0] of cardinality greater than (1 − θ)m0, θ ∈ (0, 1/2), is at mostm02m0h(θ). The proof
is completed by ensuring that the exponent on right-side above is negative.
It only remains to prove Eq. (22) and Lemma A.4, which we do next.
Proof of Eq. (22). Consider random variables ξi := (V
⊺
i 1), i ∈ [m]. Note that E[ξi] = n/2 and
each ξi is subgaussianwith varianceparametern/4. Therefore,Pr
[
1
m
∑m
i=1 ξi > n
]
≤ exp(−mn/2).
Furthermore, since E
[
(ξi − n/2)2
]
= n/4, the random variable (ξi−n/2)2−n/4 is subexponential
with parameter 4n, which gives Pr
[
1
m
∑m
i=1(ξi − n/2)2 > 17n/4
]
≤ exp(−m/2). Thus,
Pr
[
1
m
m∑
i=1
ξ2i >
3
4
· n2 + 17
4
· n
]
≤ Pr
[
1
m
m∑
i=1
ξi > n
]
+ Pr
[
1
m
m∑
i=1
(ξi − n/2)2 > 5n/4
]
≤ 2 exp
(
−m
2
)
,
which leads to the claimed bound.
Proof of Lemma A.4. For a fixed x ∈ Rn, consider random variables ζi := (V ⊺x), i ∈ [m]. They
are all zero-mean and are subgaussian with variance parameter ‖x‖22/4. Furthermore, their sec-
ond moment E
[
ζ2i
]
equals ‖x‖22/4. Therefore, the random variable ζ2i −‖x‖22/4 is subexponential
with parameter 4‖x‖22, and we have Pr
[
1
m
∑m
i=1 ζ
2
i >
17
4 · ‖x‖22
]
≤ exp (−m2 ).
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Next, consider a δ-net N2 of the unit ball under ‖·‖2 of cardinality |N2| ≤ e2n/δ. For a y such
that ‖y‖2 = 1 and y⊺Amy = λmax(Am), consider the x ∈ N2 such that ‖y − x‖2 ≤ δ. Then, since
y⊺Amy = x
⊺Amx+ 2(y − x)TAmy, we have
λmax(Am) = y
⊺Amy ≤ x⊺Amx+ 2δλmax(Am),
which further gives
(1− 2δ)λmax(Am) ≤ max
x∈N2
x⊺Amx.
Also, every x ∈ N2 satisfies ‖x‖2 ≤ 1 + δ, a and so, by the tail-probability bound for
∑m
i=1 ζ
2
i that
we saw above, we get Pr
[
1
m
∑m
i=1 ζ
2
i >
17(1+δ)2
4
]
exp (2n/δ −m/2). Therefore, we obtain
Pr
[
λmax(Am) >
17(1 + δ)2
4(1− 2δ)
]
≤ exp
(
−m
2
)
.
In particular, we can set δ = 1/4 to get the claimed result with c2 = 425/32 and c3 = 8.
We close with a proof of Lemma 3.4, which we recall below for easy reference.
Lemma A.5 (Additivity of tails Lemma 3.4, restated). Let a1, . . . , am ≥ 0, and suppose Y1, . . . , Ym
are non-negative random variables with Pr[Yi ≥ ai ] ≥ c for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m, for some c ∈ (0, 1).
Then,
Pr
[
Y1 + . . .+ Ym ≥ c · a1 + . . . + am
2
]
≥ c
2− c .
Proof. Let a1, . . . , am ≥ 0 and Y1, . . . , Ym be as in the statement, and define Zi := ai1{Yi≥ai} for
i ∈ [m]. Then Z1, . . . , Zm satisfy the assumptions of the lemma as well, namely Pr[Zi ≥ ai ] ≥ c.
Further, Pr[Y1 + . . .+ Ym ≥ α ] ≥ Pr[Z1 + . . .+ Zm ≥ α ] for all α. Thus it suffices to prove the
statement for the Zi’s, which are supported on two points, which is what we do.
Let Z := Z1 + . . . + Zm. By the assumption, we have E[Z] ≥ c(a1 + . . . + am), and 0 ≤ Z ≤
a1 + . . .+ am. By Markov’s inequality applied to
∑m
i=1 ai − Z ≥ 0, for γ ∈ (0, 1),
Pr
[
Z < γc
m∑
i=1
ai
]
= Pr
[
m∑
i=1
ai − Z > (1− γc)
m∑
i=1
ai
]
≤
∑m
i=1 ai − E[Z]
(1− γc)∑mi=1 ai ≤
1− c
1− γc = 1−
(1− γ)c
1− γc .
Taking γ := 1/2 yields the claim.
B Miscellaneous: some useful lemmas
We provide in this appendix two simple results, mentioned in the preliminaries. We begin with a
simple proposition, which allowed us throughout the paper on to assume that one can partition
the domain [k] into any number L of equal-sized sets. Indeed, as shown below, when aiming
to perform (k, ε)-identity testing this can always be achieved at the cost of only a constant mul-
tiplicative factor in the distance parameter ε (and only requires private randomness, as well as
knowledge of k and L, from the n users).
33
Proposition B.1. Let k, L ≥ 1 be two integers with 1 ≤ L ≤ k, and define k′ := L ⌈k/L⌉. There
exists an explicit mapping Φk,L : ∆(k) → ∆(k′) such that (i) the uniform distribution is mapped
to the uniform distribution, i.e., Φk,L(uk) = uk′ ; and (ii) distances are approximately preserved:
for every p,q ∈ ∆(k),
dTV(Φk,L(p),Φk,L(q)) =
k
k′
dTV(p,q) ≥
1
2
dTV(p,q) .
Further, there exists a randomizedmappingΨk,L such that, for every p ∈ ∆(k),Ψk,L(X) ∼ Φk,L(p)
wheneverX ∼ p.
Proof. We define Φk,L as a mixture of the input and the uniform distribution on [k] \ [k′]: for any
p ∈ ∆(k), Φk,L(p) := kk′p+ k
′−k
k′ u[k]\[k′] . Recalling that k ≤ k′ < k+L, is immediate to verify that
all the claimed properties hold.
Applying the above with L := 2⌊log k⌋, we in particular get the following:
Corollary B.2. Let k ≥ 1 be any integer, and define k′ := 2⌈log k⌉ ∈ [k, 2k). There exists an explicit
mappingΦk : ∆(k)→ ∆(k′) such that, for every p,q ∈ ∆(k),
1
2
dTV(p,q) ≤ dTV(Φk(p),Φk(q)) ≤ dTV(p,q) .
Further, there exists a randomized mapping Ψk such that, for every p ∈ ∆(k), Ψk(X) ∼ Φk(p)
wheneverX ∼ p.
In view of this corollary, we without loss of generality can assume throughout that k is a power
of two.
C Omitted proof: Deterministic Amplification
In this appendix, we provide for completeness a proof of Lemma 4.2, the “deterministic error
reduction” lemma we used in the argument of Theorem 4.1. The idea underlying this determin-
istic error reduction for RP is well-known, and was introduced by Karp, Pippenger, and Sipser in
1985 [KPS85]. The gist is to see the random string σ as the index of a vertex is a d-regular graph on
2s vertices, and then run the algorithm on all d neighbors of this random vertex vr. If the graph
is a good enough expander, doing so will ensure not all d neighbors cause the algorithm to err.
(For more on deterministic amplification for RP (one-sided) and BPP (two-sided) algorithms,
as well as the related notion of exponential error amplification with few extra random bits, see,
e.g., [CW89, CG89], or [HLW06, Sections 1.3.3 and 3.3]).
We begin by recalling some definitions and a useful lemma. Fix n, d ∈ N and λ ≥ 0. We
say that a d-regular graph G = (V,E) on n vertices with (normalized) adjacency matrix A has
spectral expansion λ if λ(G) ≤ λ, where λ(G) := max(|λ2|, |λn|) and 1 ≥ λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λn ≥ −1
are the eigenvalues of A.
Theorem C.1 (Expander Mixing Lemma). Let G = (V,E) be a d-regular graph on n vertices with
spectral expansion λ. Then, for every S, T ⊆ V ,
| |e(S, T )|
dn
− |S|
n
· |T |
n
| ≤ λ
√
|S|
n
· |T |
n
,
where e(S, T ) = { (u, v) ∈ E : u ∈ S, v ∈ T }.
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We are now ready to prove Lemma 4.2, restated below.
Lemma C.2 (Deterministic Amplification for One-Sided Error (RP)). For any s ∈ N and η, γ ∈
(0, 1), there exist d = d(η, γ) and (time-efficiently computable) functions π1, . . . , πd : {0, 1}s →
{0, 1}s such that the following holds. Suppose X0 ⊆ X and A : X × {0, 1}s → Ω and E ⊆ Ω satisfy
(i) If x ∈ X0, Prσ∼{0,1}s [A(x, σ) ∈ E ] = 1 (Perfect completeness)
(ii) If x /∈ X0, Prσ∼{0,1}s [A(x, σ) /∈ E ] ≥ 1− η (Low soundness)
Then we have
(i) If x ∈ X0, Prσ∼{0,1}s [ ∀i ∈ [d], A(x, πi(σ)) ∈ E ] = 1 (Perfect completeness)
(ii) If x /∈ X0, Prσ∼{0,1}s [ ∃i ∈ [d], A(x, πi(σ)) /∈ E ] ≥ 1− γ (High soundness)
Moreover, on can take d = O˜
(
η
(1−η)2γ
)
.
Proof. Fix A as in the statement, and let G = (V,E) be a d-regular graph on n := 2s vertices
with spectral expansion λ ≤ (1 − η)√γ/η, for some d. We define π1, . . . , πd as follows: fixing any
labeling of the vertices of G, we see r ∈ {0, 1}s as a vertex vr ∈ V and let π1(r), . . . , πd(r) be the
labels of the d neighbors of vr in G.
To see why the claimed properties hold, first note that whenever x ∈ X0, then as A has one-
sided error we have A(x, πi(σ)) ∈ E for all i with probability one. To establish the second item,
fix x /∈ X0, and define Bx ⊆ {0, 1}s as the set of “bad” random seeds, i.e., those on which A errs:
Bx := { σ ∈ {0, 1}s : A(x, σ) ∈ E } .
By assumption, |Bx| ≤ η · 2s. Now, consider the set B˜x of random seeds for which all neighbors
are bad seeds, that is those seeds for which A(x, πi(σ)) fails for all i ∈ [d]:
B˜x := { σ ∈ {0, 1}s : ∀i ∈ [d] , A(x, πi(σ)) ∈ E } .
Since every σ ∈ B˜x has d “bad” neighbors, we must have |e(B˜x, Bx)| ≥ d|B˜x|. Applying the
Expander Mixing Lemma (Theorem C.1), we get
|e(B˜x, Bx)|
dn
≤ |Bx|
n
· |B˜x|
n
+ λ
√
|Bx|
n
· |B˜x|
n
which implies, recalling the above bounds on both |B˜x| and |Bx|, d|B˜x|dn ≤ η · |B˜x|n + λ
√
η · |B˜x|n .
Rearranging,
|B˜x|
n
≤ λ2 η
(1− η)2
which is at most γ by our choice of λ. Therefore, for every x /∈ X0, Prσ
[
x ∈ B˜x
]
≤ γ, establishing
the high-soundness statement.
The bound on d, as well as the time efficiency statement, finally follow from the following
construction of expanders, due to Bilu and Linial:
Theorem C.3 ([HLW06, Theorem 6.12]). For every d ≥ 3, and every n ≥ 1, there exists an explicit
d-regular graphG on n vertices with spectral expansion λ = O((log3/2 d)/
√
d). Moreover,G can be
constructed in time polynomial in n and d.
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To achieve the desired bound on λ2, it therefore suffices to have d = O˜
(
η
(1−η)2γ
)
.
Remark C.4. By a probabilistic argument, for all n, d ≥ 1, and every constant δ > 0, there ex-
ist d-regular graphs on n vertices with spectral expansion λ ≤ (2 + δ)√d− 1/d (more precisely,
almost all d-regular graph on n vertices have spectral expansion atmost (2+δ)
√
d− 1/d). There-
fore, if one does not insist on being able to efficiently construct such a graph, the bound on d
in Lemma C.2 can be improved to d ≥ 4.1η(1−η)2γ .
D Omitted proof: Proof of Theorem 5.5
In this appendix, we prove of Theorem 5.5, restated below.
Theorem D.1 (Theorem 5.5, restated). Given n ∈ N, ε ∈ (0, 1), s ∈ N, for a channel familyW the
(n, ε, s)-semimaxmin chi-square fluctuation is bounded as
χ(2)(Wn, ε, s) = O
(
n2ε4
k3
· 2s · max
W∈W
‖H(W )‖2∗
)
,
whenever
n ≤ k
3/2
Cε22s/2maxW∈W ‖H(W )‖∗
, (23)
where C > 0 is a constant.
Proof. To obtain the desired bound for semimaxmin chi-square fluctuation, we fix an arbitrary
multiset Ws ⊆ W¯n of size at most 2s, and bound the average (over W n in Ws) decoupled chi-
square fluctuation for a suitable almost ε-perturbation Pζ . With this in mind, suppose we have
a random variable Z = (Z1, . . . , Zk/2) taking values in [−1, 1]k/2 and with distribution ζ such that
Pr
[
‖Z‖1 ≥
k
β
]
≥ α (24)
for some constants α ≥ 1/10 and β > 0. For ε ∈ (0, β−1), consider the perturbed family around
uk consisting of elements pz, z ∈ [−1, 1]k/2, given by
pz =
1
k
(
1 + βεz1, 1− βεz1, . . . , 1 + βεzt, 1− βεzt, . . . , 1 + βεzk/2, 1− βεzk/2
)
. (25)
By our assumption on Z (Eq. (24)), pZ then satisfies dTV(pZ ,uk) =
βε
k ‖Z‖1 ≥ ε with probability
at least α. Consider anyW n ∈ Wns . From the same steps as in [ACT18, Theorem IV.14], we get
χ(2) (W n | Pζ) = lnEZZ′
[
exp
(
β2nε2
k
· Z⊺H¯(W n)Z ′
)]
, (26)
whereZ,Z ′ are independent random variableswith commondistribution ζ, H¯(W n) := 1n
∑n
j=1H(Wj),
andH(Wj) is defined as in Eq. (13). Now, to bound the semimaxmin chi-square fluctuation, we
must handle EWn [χ(2) (W n | Pζ)], forW n drawn uniformly at random fromWs. We thus define
the new “aggregate” matrix
H˜(Ws) :=
∑
Wn∈Ws
H(W n)
36
to which we apply a construction of Acharya, Canonne, and Tyagi, whose properties we summa-
rize below.
Lemma D.2 (Implicit in the proof of [ACT18, Theorem IV.18]). Let A ∈ R(k/2)×(k/2) be a p.s.d.
matrix. Then, there exists a matrix V ∈ R(k/2)×(k/4) such that the following holds.
(i) Each row vector of V has ℓ2 norm at most 1, and V has Frobenius norm ‖V ‖F ≥
√
k/2.
(ii) Let Y = (Y1 . . . Yk/4) be a vector of i.i.d. Rademacher random variables. Then,
9
Pr
[
‖V Y ‖1 ≥
k
12
√
2
]
≥ 1
9
.
(iii) We have ‖V ⊺AV ‖2F ≤ 4k‖A‖2∗.
We invoke this lemma on H˜(Ws), and denote by V ∈ R(k/2)×(k/4) the resulting matrix. Let-
ting ζ be the distribution of the random variable Z := V Y , where Y is a vector of k/4 i.i.d.
Rademacher random variables, item (ii) implies that ζ satisfies the condition from Eq. (24), for
α := 1/9 and c := 1/(12
√
2). Moreover, since all H(W n) (and therefore all V ⊺H(W n)V ’s) are
symmetric p.s.d. matrices, we have10
‖V ⊺
∑
Wn∈Ws
H(W n)V ‖2F ≥
∑
Wn∈Ws
‖V ⊺H(W n)V ‖2F ,
or, equivalently, 2−s‖V ⊺H˜(Ws)V ‖2F ≥ EWn
[
‖V ⊺H(W n)V ‖2F
]
. However, by item (iii), ‖V ⊺H˜(Ws)V ‖2F ≤
(4/k)‖H˜(Ws)‖2∗. Since, by the triangle inequality, we further have
‖H˜(Ws)‖∗ ≤ 2s maxWn∈Ws‖H(W
n)‖∗ ≤ 2s maxW∈W‖H(W )‖∗
we obtain
EWn
[
‖V ⊺H(W n)V ‖2F
]
≤ 4 · 2
s
k
max
W∈W
‖H(W )‖2∗ . (27)
We cannowboundEWn[χ(2) (W n | Pζ)]. Let c > 0be the constant from the statement of Lemma5.4.
Setting λ := (β2nε2)/k and recalling our assumption (Eq. (23)) on n, we have
1 ≥ 16β
2nε22s/2 ·maxW∈W‖H(W )‖∗
ck3/2
≥ 8λ
c
√
EWn
[
‖V ⊺H(W n)V ‖2F
]
≥ 8λ
c
EWn
[
‖V ⊺H(W n)V ‖F
]
≥ 8λ
c
EWn
[
ρ(V ⊺H¯(W n)V )
]
,
where the second inequality is Eq. (27) and ρ(A) denotes the spectral norm of matrix A. By
Markov’s inequality, we have that
Pr
Wn
[
ρ(V ⊺H¯(W n)V ) >
1
4λ
]
≤ c
2
.
9We note that this second item is a consequence of the first, along with Khintchine’s inequality and an anticon-
centration argument; see [ACT18, Claim IV.21]. For clarity, we nonetheless explicitly state both here.
10This follows from the fact that TrAB ≥ 0 for two p.s.d. matrices A,B; and thus ‖A + B‖2F = Tr[(A + B)
2] =
Tr[A2] + Tr[B2] + 2 Tr[AB] ≥ ‖A‖2F + ‖B‖
2
F .
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Let G ⊆ Ws (for “good”) be the multiset ofW n’s such that ρ(V ⊺H¯(W n)V ) ≤ 1/(4λ), which by the
above has size at least (1− c/2) · 2s. Upon reorganizing, for anyW n ∈ G we have
λ2/(1− 4λ2ρ(V ⊺H¯(W n)V )2) ≤ 4λ2/3 .
We can then apply the lemma below on the MGF of a Rademacher chaos to i.i.d. Rademacher
random variables Y and the symmetric matrix V ⊺H¯(W n)V ∈ Rk/4×k/4:
Lemma D.3 ([ACT18, Claim IV.17]). For random vectors θ, θ′ ∈ {−1, 1}k/2 with each θi and θ′i
distributed uniformly over {−1, 1}, independent of each other and independent for different i’s.
Then, for a positive semi-definite matrixH ,
lnEθθ′
[
eλθ
⊺Hθ′
]
≤ λ
2
2
· ‖H‖
2
F
1− 4λ2ρ(H)2 , ∀ 0 ≤ λ <
1
2ρ(H)
,
where ‖·‖F denotes the Frobenius norm and ρ(·) the spectral radius.
This gives, for anyW n ∈ G,
EZZ′
[
exp
(
β2nε2
k · Z⊺H¯(W n)Z ′
)]
= EY Y ′ [e
β2nε2
k
Y ⊺V ⊺H¯(Wn)V Y ′ ] ≤ e 2β
4n2ε4
3k2
‖V ⊺H¯(Wn)V ‖2F .
From there, by concavity and using Jensen’s inequality, we obtain
EWn[1 ∧ χ(2) (W n | Pζ)] ≤ EWn [χ(2) (W n | Pζ)1G(W n) + 1Gc(W n)]
≤ EWn [χ(2) (W n | Pζ)1G(W n)] + c
2
≤ EWn [ln(e
2β4n2ε4
3k2
‖V ⊺H¯(Wn)V ‖2F )] +
c
2
≤ ln(e 2β
4n2ε4
3k2
EWn [‖V
⊺H¯(Wn)V ‖2F ]) +
c
2
.
The above, along with Eq. (27), then finally yields
EWn [1 ∧ χ(2) (W n | Pζ)] ≤ 8β
4n2ε42s
3k3
max
W∈W
‖H(W )‖2∗ +
c
2
,
which, invoking Lemma 5.4, completes the proof.
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